The First Primary: Why New Hampshire? by Moore, David W & Smith, Andrew
The First Primary: Why New Hampshire? 
David W. Moore and Andrew E. Smith
December 23, 2019
CARSEY PERSPECTIVESUniversity ofNew HampshireCarsey School of
Public Policy
For the past half century, political leaders, representatives of various states, and media pundits have excoriated the premier positions 
that New Hampshire and Iowa hold in the presiden-
tial delegate selection process. Why should these two 
small, mostly white states, which hardly represent 
the diversity of voters across the country, especially 
voters in the Democratic Party, host the first presi-
dential nominating contests? The impact of winning 
there is undeniable,1 and, the argument goes, it’s not 
fair to other states and to many presidential candi-
dates that these states wield such influence.
That criticism was made explicit in this election 
cycle by Julian Castro, who is not doing well in the 
polls in Iowa and New Hampshire and perhaps can 
afford to offend the voters of those two states by 
suggesting that they should not always be first. “We 
can’t as a Democratic Party continually and justifi-
ably complain about Republicans who suppress the 
vote of people of color, and then turn around and 
start our nominating contest in two states that, even 
though they take their role seriously, hardly have any 
people of color,” he told reporters in Iowa.2 
expectation that these states would emerge with the 
enormous influence that comes with being first. But 
once Iowa and New Hampshire were first, and once 
they realized the extensive benefits the position 
brought to them, their leaders fought tenaciously  
to hold on to their advantage.  
Origin of the New Hampshire Presidential 
Primary
The Granite State’s decision to adopt a presidential 
primary was born out of the progressive movement 
of the late nineteenth century, which, among other 
reforms, led to the constitutional right of women to 
vote. New Hampshire adopted primaries for local 
and state elections starting in 1910, and then insti-
tuted a presidential primary for the 1916 election. To 
save money, the state legislature decided to hold the 
primary on Town Meeting Day, the second Tuesday 
in March.3 For over two centuries, New Hampshire’s 
town meetings had been timed to occur in mid-
March,4 after the most brutal part of the winter and 
before the muddy season, which made it difficult 
to travel. Thus, Yankee frugality and the cold New 
England climate contributed to the timing of the 
New Hampshire presidential primary, which has 
been the first primary in each presidential election 
cycle for one hundred years.
Emergence of the Beauty Contest
From 1920 until 1948, the New Hampshire primary 
consisted of ballots only for delegates to the party 
conventions. Then, in 1952, the state legislature 
passed a law specifying that in addition to the bal-
lots for delegates there would also be ballots for 
the presidential candidates, with their names listed 
separately. This arrangement was widely referred 
to as the “beauty contest,” because the vote for the 
presidential candidates had no official impact. It was 
theoretically possible for a presidential candidate 
to win the beauty contest and still not win the most 
delegates, since prominent delegates, well-known 
state leaders in their own right, might attract more 
The actual developments by which these states 
came to be first were accidental.
Castro has a point. There is nothing rational or 
fair about a presidential nominating process that 
allows two small states to hold the first nominat-
ing contests every four years. Partisans from both 
states like to justify this controversial arrangement 
by arguing that it puts candidates in the position of 
having to meet voters one-on-one, providing would-
be presidents with insights into the American public 
they would not get in larger, more media-dominated 
states. But the actual developments by which these 
states came to be first were accidental, generated 
by a variety of events not at all intended to educate 
future leaders and certainly not adopted with any 
votes than other delegates supporting the candidate 
preferred by the voters.5 Still, the beauty contest 
became the event to watch. Over the next twenty 
years, the New Hampshire primary remained the 
first delegate-selection contest, the first “real” vote 
for a presidential candidate.
In the overall national delegate-selection process, 
however, little had changed. Some candidates —such as 
Democrat Estes Kefauver in 1952—could arrive at their 
party’s convention having won more delegates through 
the primaries than any other of their competitors, and 
still not win the nomination. The reason was that fewer 
than half the national delegates were chosen by prima-
ries; most were appointed by party leaders in the states 
or selected in state conventions largely controlled by 
party elites (as in Iowa). At the national party conven-
tions, the delegates would mostly vote the way they 
were instructed by party leaders. 
Origin of the Iowa Presidential Caucuses
From its very beginning as a state when it joined the 
union in 1846, Iowa adopted the caucus and convention 
process for nominating candidates to political office. The 
state has since adopted primaries for statewide elections, 
but it continues to use the caucus/convention method 
for selecting delegates to the national party conventions. 
That process is an extended one. It begins with 
precinct caucuses (meetings) throughout the state 
(currently Iowa has over 2,000 precincts), where party 
members participate in discussions about issues and 
presidential candidates, and elect delegates to the county 
conventions. At the county conventions, a similar pro-
cess occurs, resulting in delegates elected to attend the 
congressional district conventions. At the congressional 
district conventions, delegates are elected to their party’s 
state convention. Depending on the political party, 
some of the presidential delegates are elected at the 
district conventions and some at the state convention. 
The complete selection of presidential delegates is not 
finalized until late in the spring, and the results for the 
presidential candidates often differ considerably from 
what was indicated in the initial caucus meetings. As 
one researcher noted, the Iowa caucus precinct results 
(those recorded in the very first caucus meetings) “are 
neither valid nor reliable indicators of the presidential 
preferences of delegates elected to succeeding levels in 
the caucus and convention process.”6 
Until 1972, the national news media paid virtually 
no attention to the results of the early precinct meet-
ings in Iowa. There was no way to assess the early 
results, since there was no preference vote among the 
voters who attended the caucuses, and there was no 
way to project which presidential candidates might 
win the most delegates in the final stage of this pro-
cess, usually ending in May. And, as was the case with 
most caucus states, party leaders typically exerted tight 
control over the selection of presidential delegates and 
would attend the national party conventions accompa-
nied by mostly uncommitted delegates who would vote 
the way the party leaders said. 
Democratic Party Reforms 
Objections to the party’s essentially undemocratic 
nomination process came to a head after the Democratic 
National Convention in 1968. Disillusioned antiwar 
Democrats, along with many party leaders who felt the 
nomination process needed to become more democ-
ratized, supported the establishment of a special com-
mission to propose rules that would make delegate 
selection more democratic. The Commission on Party 
Structure and Delegate Selection, formed shortly after 
the 1968 presidential election, was chaired initially by 
Senator George McGovern and, after he resigned to run 
for president, then by Representative Donald Fraser. It 
became known as the McGovern-Fraser Commission. 
The overall impact of the reforms was to change  
the locus of political power from the party leaders 
to the party voters. 
The intent of the reforms was to increase participa-
tion of rank-and-file party members and to ensure that 
the full racial, ethnic, and gender diversity of party 
members was represented in the state delegations to 
the national convention. The new rules also called for 
more transparency in holding caucuses that chose 
national delegates. The overall impact of the reforms 
was to change the locus of political power from the 
party leaders to the party voters. The voters would 
choose the delegates, either in primary elections or in 
open state caucuses and subsequent conventions. 
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Iowa Jockeys to Be First 
The reforms had little immediate direct impact on 
the New Hampshire primary, which continued to be 
scheduled on Town Meeting Day, the second Tuesday 
of March. But the reforms did bring about significant 
changes in the Iowa caucuses, which now had to abide 
by a number of rules to make the process more trans-
parent. Thus, in Iowa, the Democrats had to calculate 
how they could meet all of the transparency require-
ments and still meet a schedule that called for the final 
state convention to be held in mid-May (a date that 
was determined by the availability of a place to meet). 
Ultimately, they decided to hold their first round of cau-
cuses on January 24, the earliest start of any state’s nomi-
nation process. According to author Hugh Winebrenner, 
“the party leaders maintain that there was no political 
intent in moving the caucus date forward and confess 
that they were unaware that the Iowa Democratic cau-
cuses would be the nation’s first as a result of the move.”7 
Still, as Castro’s comments make clear, the issues of 
fairness and logic continue to rankle. Much has changed 
in the past half century of history. The nomination 
process should change too. Yet, as New Hampshire 
Secretary of State William Gardner has observed,  
“An ounce of history is worth a pound of logic.”
The Carsey Perspectives series gives authors the opportunity to 
present their analysis of important topics that is not based on 
original data analysis.
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New Hampshire, which had expected to be “first in 
the nation,” was now relegated to the first primary.
Regardless of intent, Iowa had now positioned itself 
as the first state holding a vote that directly affected 
the presidential nomination process. New Hampshire, 
positioned as the first state holding a primary elec-
tion, believed that Iowa’s caucuses would be given 
little attention. The national media had never given 
much coverage to the early caucus results, so there 
was no expectation that the situation would change. 
Nevertheless, the press did start to cover Iowa’s early 
results, and the Hawkeye State became the media’s 
first meaningful contest in the nomination process. 
New Hampshire, which had expected to be “first in the 
nation,” was now relegated to the first primary.
Over the next several election cycles, Iowa and New 
Hampshire defended their claims to hold the first contests 
and eventually obtained official endorsement from both 
major parties. The main reason the parties acquiesced 
was that no consensus could be found among state party 
leaders for any other system. A national primary would 
be too costly, and it would reward those candidates with 
the most money. Also, it wasn’t obvious which other states 
should be first rather than Iowa and New Hampshire, or 
whether their voters would be “better” than those in Iowa 
or New Hampshire to judge presidential material.
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